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Bridging the
Religious Divide
RAYMOND L. BINGHAM

A

cademicians, east and west, hotly debate the fundaments of the war on
terror. In our nation’s capital, decisionmakers and renowned scholars
meet regularly to posit the pros and cons of US foreign policy. Internationally,
countless daily editorials are published highlighting current US efforts and
shortcomings in the Middle East. Much has also been written about Osama bin
Laden, the Taliban, the insurgency, and the mechanics of the 9/11 attacks. Conversely, the one debate that seems to elude even our best and brightest intellectuals is an assessment of why—not how—9/11 occurred. Efforts to defeat
ongoing insurgent attempts to destabilize Iraq and Afghanistan must start with
a debate on what is driving the nature of conflict in the region. Understanding
why the insurgents hate America so much is equally important as knowing how
the attackers of 9/11 were able to infiltrate our systems of protection.
Over the last two years, after countless lessons learned during Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, Coalition forces now have a limited but clearer understanding of the drivers of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan.
A number of redeployed top military commanders recently pointed out that the
true nature of this war is centered on economics, political will, culture, and religious ideology.1 Research indicates that many Islamic scholars concur with the
following assessment: the insurgency is slowly developing into a war of ideas
that will serve as a catalyst for the globalization of religious extremism if left
unchecked. The analysis that follows focuses on the vital but poorly understood role that religion is playing in shaping the ongoing insurgency in the
Middle East, an insurgency fueled by religious extremists.

The Role of Religion: Understanding the Culture of Islam
The Iraqi insurgency clearly demonstrates the existing chasm between western and eastern cultures. Understanding Arab culture and the cul50

Parameters

ture of Islam is the first step in bridging the religious divide that America
currently faces. America must get to know the people of Islam and their cultural imperatives. Our understanding needs to account for every tribe, sect,
and social class, to include radical extremists; we must become students of Islam. Abdurrahman Wahid implores governments, people of faith, and strategic planners alike using a straightforward message: “We are in a crisis of
misunderstanding—of Islam; even by Muslims themselves.”2 For many, his
message is hard to hear; the distractions of globalization, urbanization, and
transnational terrorism cloud the reception of those with the greatest need to
listen. Our failure to understand the nature of Islam permits the radicalization
of Muslims worldwide while blinding the rest of humanity to a solution which
hides in plain sight—a solution that must include a closer examination of the
influence Islam has on its community of faith.3 Before America can build an
effective strategy to neutralize the extremist ideologies that underpin the
Iraqi insurgency (and by extension, the global Islamic extremist movement),
we must first commit to understanding Islam as it is practiced and observed
by Muslims today.
The need to understand religious culture as a key element of change
in the Middle East is further evidenced by the failure of US and international
efforts to effectively engage religious leaders with any measurable consistency. US strategies for dealing with religious actors have tended to be ambivalent and reactive, focusing exclusively on certain religions or leaders seen as
either close allies or immediate threats. When religion is addressed, the discussion is too broad, and the work often takes the form of dialogue rather than
focusing on actions, processes, and results. Scholars of Islam take a slightly
different approach to the issue. They characterize the ongoing war of ideas as
a lack of western understanding regarding religion and the role of indigenous religious leaders in the Middle East. These misunderstandings center on
America’s lack of knowledge of Islam, the Quran, and the religious faith of
Muslims, which is in direct contrast to the liberal interpretations taken by astute Islamist extremists with Islam and the Quran. Muslims are not convinced
that the secular humanism the United States is offering is the right solution for
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followers of Islam. By far the biggest challenge to the US push for democracy
and modernization in the Middle East is not the insurgency in Iraq; it is the basic characteristics of Islam itself.
Francis Fukuyama takes a similar point of view concerning the culture of Islamists: “Extremists exploit the common misunderstanding of Muslims’ holistic view of life; everything is religion and everything is Islam;
financial, social, intellectual, theological, military, and political.”4 For many
Muslims the war of ideas, rightly or wrongly, boils down to the perception
that the Global War on Terrorism is essentially a systematic attack on their
faith. In direct contrast to Mr. Fukuyama, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi offered a
point of view that is usually dismissed (in the west) as simply more extremist
rhetoric. Zarqawi stated, “We are fighting so that Allah’s word becomes supreme and religion is all for Allah. Anyone who opposes this goal or stands in
the way of this aim is our enemy and will be a target for our swords, regardless
of their name or lineage—a Muslim American is our dear brother: an infidel
Arab is our hated enemy, even if we both come from the same womb.”5 This
divergence of ideals magnifies the depth and breadth of division between
policymakers and insurgents. While the American government and the US
military fight for democracy and freedom, radical Islamists and the insurgency point to religion and religious obligation as their primary source of
motivation to defend Islam. When the United States invaded Iraq, the American government intended to strike a blow for freedom; however, the forces
unleashed were considerably more complex. When the Pandora’s box of religion was opened, extremist ideologies brewing for the last 30 years came
pouring out, ideologies that are now fueled by America’s continued presence
in Afghanistan and Iraq.
These and other complexities are better understood when we take a
closer look at the customs and traditions of Muslim society as a whole. For example, researcher Ron Hassner points out that civil and customary law in Muslim states often extends the restrictions on non-Muslim access from the
boundaries of a shrine to the city in which a shrine is located or to the entire region surrounding the shrine. Consequently, protests in Muslim states have occurred in opposition to the presence of Coalition forces in Iraqi cities known for
their sacred sites. Indeed, several Muslim movements hold the extreme position that any non-Muslim presence on Muslim lands constitutes sacrilege.
Osama bin Laden also expressed his support for this opinion in his initial call
for jihad against the United States. Hassner concludes that a similar position
has been embraced by radical opponents of the US occupation of Iraq who consider the very presence of foreign troops in the Persian Gulf as an affront to Islam and compare it with the Crusades or the Mongol invasion of Iraq.6 While
western culturists grapple with the compatibility of democratic values and
52
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Islam, the equally complex subject of religious influence adds to an already
heated debate.

Religious Influence: The Sistani Factor
International bombings and the continued conflict in the Middle
East have sent scholars, planners, and senior leaders worldwide scrambling
to harness the influence of Islam on the Muslims and leaders in their communities. It also appears evident that not many diplomatic strategists predicted and even fewer military planners were prepared for the significant
role several Islamic leaders have established in the ongoing conflict. Osama
bin Laden, Ayatollah Sistani, and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi each demonstrated
their ability to impede progress or influence change within the Muslim community. Understanding this type of religious influence on all aspects of
change in an Islamic society is critical to the successful integration of democracy and the stability of the region. For instance, in Kabul, Afghanistan, prosecutors charged Abdul Rahman with apostasy during his recent divorce
hearing because he had converted from Islam to Christianity 16 years prior.
The charge is punishable by death under some interpretations of Islamic law.
The judge hearing the case said Mr. Rahman would get the death penalty unless he repudiated Christianity.7 This example underlines the uneasy balance
between Afghanistan’s new Constitution and conservative Islamic values
within the legal system, and it emphasizes Shireen Hunter’s point that “in the
near term there will be more obstacles than remedies as modernization and
democratization meet the Muslim world.”8
The demonstrated influence of the Grand Ayatollah Ali Husseini alSistani became clear to the Coalition Provisional Authority and senior military commanders on the ground when Sistani issued a number of fatwas to
direct participation in the voting process.9 When the Askaria Shrine was attacked, the Grand Ayatollah, once again, stepped in with a different type
of authority. He spoke of the need for Shi’ite Muslims to defend themselves
with armed, religious militias if the Americans and the Iraqi government
cannot.10 This magnitude of influence by religious leaders implores additional questioning. Were the civil and military strategic planners and the Coalition Authority aware of the Ayatollah’s influence prior to the fatwas being
issued? Were strategic planners aware of his span of control prior to arriving
in theater? Finally, what are they doing to bring Sistani aboard now? The answers to these questions will serve as yet another measure of the divide between the religious leaders of Afghanistan and Iraq and the makers of policy
in the United States.
Pakistani officials recently provided information on the Arab (religious) influence of madrassas in the 20th century. In 1979, Saudi-Wahhabi
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proselytizing was initiated in response to the Shi’ite Islamic Revolution in
Iran. Geoffrey Clarfield explains how petro-dollar-funded preachers and
teachers wielded powerful influence on the face of Pakistani Islam because
the Quran is printed in Arabic and Pakistanis do not read Arabic. Interestingly, if the preacher or teacher stresses a Wahhabi interpretation, then the
people—unable to read Arabic—have no scriptural grounds from which to
argue with him.11 During the 1980s, Kashmiriat was dealt a blow from which
it may never recover. Moderate Kashmiri Muslims woke up to find that their
mosques had new preachers, many of whom had been trained outside the
country. They preached against old versions of Islam and insisted that their
intolerant Wahhabi strain must be adopted by all Kashmiris. Women were to
adopt the veil, and music was forbidden. They also preached that indigenous
Hindus should be forced to leave, so that Kashmir could become a land reserved for Muslims. No doubt they were inspired by the world’s silence following the near total expulsion of the 50,000-strong Hindu community of
Kabul after its conquest by the Taliban.12
An improved understanding of the Islamic rule of law and how Muslims interpret the Quran is imperative to the successful incorporation of western ideals. Western values, including individual and religious freedoms, are
not natural fits for the culture of Islam. Iraqi politician Iyad Jamal Al-Din
notes that young boys, as a way of life, grow up with religion in the Middle
East. They end up in the mosque, learning from the Imam; depending on the
interpretation, they learn moderation or extremism, and in between the two,
there lies an abyss.13 As a result, more and more Muslims are answering the
jihadi call to arms—which has led some observers to accuse the Islamic
clergy of booby-trapping minds and exploiting the state of frustration suffered by the Muslim youth to perpetuate violence.14
This influence by the Imams, Mullahs, and clerics over the young,
disenfranchised, and impressionable is more than significant in determining
what Islam is and what values are promoted. Islam’s sphere of influence
seems unlimited in Middle Eastern culture. Many religious leaders in the
Middle East regularly stimulate efforts to provide humanitarian relief, pursue
justice, and advance peace while simultaneously arranging attacks. Moqtada
al-Sadr, the outspoken Shi’ite cleric and growing political force in Iraq, who
has led two deadly uprisings against American troops, is emerging as a dominant figure in Iraqi politics. During several volatile periods in Iraq, Moqtada
al-Sadr also assisted in providing food, medical care, and security in poor
neighborhoods, preventing widespread Shi’ite attacks on civilians, while simultaneously encouraging violence against US military forces.15 In recent
strife, religious leaders like Sadr routinely demonstrate their ability to justify
social division, sanction terrorism, and encourage violence.
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Religion and influential religious leaders continue to play a critical
role in shaping global strife and reconciliation. Whether destructive or constructive, religious leaders, organizations, and institutions often influence the
direction of conflict-prevention and post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Religious groups are typically deep-rooted, mature organizations with independent resources to shape conflict-prevention and reconstruction efforts
from the grassroots to the international level. The broad range of activities
carried out by religious actors in conflict-prone settings demonstrates both
the significant threats they may pose and the great opportunities they represent. These organizations are invaluable if effectively utilized. They are
uniquely positioned to help or hinder evolving situations at the local level far
better than any military organization or secular relief effort. Intelligence-like
assessments of the religious environment are (in hindsight) critical to mission
success. The actions of religious actors like Sistani and Sadr accentuate the
need for increased “religious situational awareness.” Policymakers, military
leaders, and nongovernmental strategic planners all benefit from understanding the influence of religion within a given region of conflict. Meaningful
work to embrace Islam’s clergy in ways that are mutually beneficial must occur if nascent peace is to become the foundation of a US exit strategy from Afghanistan and Iraq.

Islamic Extremism: A War of Ideology
The world watched the ringleader of the 7 July 2005 terrorist attack
in London, his voice inflected with a West Yorkshire accent, preaching jihad
in English. Al Jazeera aired the communique of 30-year-old Mohammad
Sidique Khan, in which Khan explained why he helped murder over 50 of his
fellow Britons on a bus and in the Underground. “Until you stop bombing,
gassing, imprisonment, and torture of my people, we will not stop this fight,”
Khan declared. “We are at war, I am a soldier and now you too will taste the reality of this situation.”16 The London bombings emphatically demonstrated
the inroads made by Wahhabi and Salafi ideologies throughout the Muslim
world, especially the alienated Muslim diasporas in Europe. Attacks like
these are further evidence that Islamic fundamentalism has evolved into a
well-financed, complex, global movement.
The religion of Islam is undergoing a significant revolution due to
the pervasive pressures of Wahhabi-Salafi and jihadi-insurgent ideologies.
The insurgency consists of people who draw upon a long tradition of extreme
intolerance within Islam that does not distinguish politics from religion and
distorts both.17 Extremists believe Islam is the only true religion and there is
no room for interpretation. A jihadi believes that his immoral acts of violence
are moral and that he is on the right path to God. Extremists also believe in fulAutumn 2006
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fillment of the Prophecy of Islam and world rule for Muslims as described in
the Quran. Dr. Louis Beres provides a staunch warning on the violent realities
that threaten mankind: “Today each and every one of us is threatened by ecstatic sacrificial killing masquerading as a resistance . . . which is best described as homicidal religious collectivism.”18
In a message commemorating the end of the annual pilgrimage to
Mecca, the ousted leader of the Taliban regime, Mullah Mohammad Omar,
called on Muslims to continue their jihad against the United States, naming
America “the greatest enemy of Islam” and further stating, “armed jihad has
become the duty of every Muslim.”19 Messages like this point to religious extremists as not only the drivers of conflict, they also appear to serve as the
originating source of disagreement. Sherifa Zuhur makes a profound observation in her research on the Islamist threat. When attempting to understand
Islamic terrorism, western scholars tend to gravitate in the direction of a view
skewed to pathology: When we think of terrorists, we believe “their minds
‘work differently’ than ours—when the issue is really one of different values
and disassociative techniques.”20 Moreover, America has a history of classifying then demonizing its enemies. The defeat of the communist Soviet
Union (the evil empire) and the end of the Cold War can be attributed to this
technique. The trouble with this practice is that we are likely to miss opportunities to fully understand our enemies and develop effective countermeasures
in our zeal to label them.
In Iraq and Afghanistan, we are currently witnessing a spiritual tugof-war between Islamic Hirabah (terrorist) and Coalition forces to win the
hearts and minds of the people who are in essence the living spirit of Islam.
This conflict is not limited to improvised explosive devices, traffic checkpoints, or door-to-door searches. This war is about regional stability, failing
nation-states, and religious ideology—a war unbounded by conventional
conflict with a reach that extends to incidents like the recent caricaturing of
the Prophet, whereupon terrorists and global jihadists rallied thousands in defense of yet another perceived attack on Islam. This perceived threat perpetuates the radical extremists’ cause and serves to lengthen an already protracted
conflict between east and west.
Most scholars agree that there is nothing intrinsically violent about Islam as a way of life. Yet many suicide bombers’ only dream is to fulfill what
they believe to be their destiny, namely to be a Shaheed (martyr).21 Obviously,
all Muslims are not Hirabah; however, all terrorist attacks (in the Middle East)
have been perpetrated by radical Muslim extremists. Publicly, extremist terror
is perpetrated in the name of Allah; yet, the terror imposed upon the world provides neither salvation nor sacredness. Clearly, there is a plethora of useful lessons to learn concerning the values, beliefs, and cultures of Islam, to include
56
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those of radical fundamentalists. An enhanced understanding through increased debate and open dialogue about the nature of religious extremists will
better assist civil and military planners in the execution and support of the foreseeable long war against (unholy) terror. The next portion of this article will
explore the strategy of the United States and the insurgents in the fight for Iraq
and Afghanistan.

Strategic Planning and Religion
Williamson Murray and Mark Grimsley write, “Strategy is an inherently human enterprise. It is not solely a consideration of objective factors;
strategy involves human passions, values, and beliefs, few of which are quantifiable.”22 A review of strategic literature on the subject of religion reveals nothing fundamentally new about radical Islamists or jihadi-insurgents. Historians
indicate that radical Muslims have been pushing for change since the beginning of Islam’s decline in the 12th century. The assassination of Anwar Sadat
and the bombing of Khobar Towers are clear examples that the insurgency did
not start with current US operations in Iraq. These past events serve to highlight years of planning by a then-budding insurgency, an insurgency that has
systematically developed into a network of operations cells, financial backers,
and communications outlets with the sole purpose of propelling the extremist
agenda forward. Although tacticians and theorists have studied the techniques
and procedures of the insurgents for years, the mainstream media and literature
give minimal consideration to the very source of the extremist strategy—the
religion of Islam.
Radical Islamism: Doctrine of the Unruly?
The fundamentalists use a strategy that is simple and straightforward.
It is rooted in Islamism; a totalitarian ideology that seeks to use Islam as a vehicle of power.23 Michael Scheuer’s recent analysis of insurgency doctrine identifies religious obligation as the central point on which al Qaeda’s insurgency
doctrine was and is grounded. Osama bin Laden and a number of Islamist leaders and clerics have declared a “defensive holy war” against the United States.
They are using an insurgency doctrine developed by al Qaeda that has been
evolving for more than a quarter-century.24 The extremists’ basic strategy is to
drape themselves in the mantle of Islam and declare their opponents kafir (infidels), thus smoothing the way for slaughtering nonfundamentalist Muslims.25
The common use of literal and highly selective interpretations of the Quran and
other Quranic teachings allows extremists to establish direct influence over the
global Muslim community.
The extremists have a grand strategy of their own. They publicly
state their objectives for all to hear: to destroy and then rebuild a new Umma
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(community of Muslims), and spread their altered version of Islam, by any
means necessary. This position is likewise supported by the Salafi-jihadists
in Iraq, who see the Iraq conflict as part of their jihad, first and foremost, and
second as a springboard for a wider regional conflict that has as its central aim
uprooting the current political order in the region.26 This aim is often achieved
through Arab-on-Arab attacks by the al Qaeda in Iraq network. But these attacks are mainly viewed as damaging to the insurgents’ cause. In this light, al
Qaeda is largely considered more of a threat to the worldwide Muslim community. In a keen display of information awareness, al Qaeda in Iraq publicly
justifies targeting Shi’ite Arabs based on their close cooperation with the occupation force and not on their supposedly “heretical” beliefs.27 Al Qaeda,
therefore, attempts to justify the targeting of Shi’ite security elements on political rather than religious grounds. Meanwhile, local insurgents spread their
extremist doctrine from tribe to tribe and mosque to mosque. They incite violence using the one bond the majority of Arabs have in common—Islam.
Internationally, al Qaeda and jihadi-insurgents have been extremely
successful in finding new recruits through their well-informed use of the internet. Their ability to spread the call to (un)holy war on a global scale using
professional-grade media production companies like As-Sahaab is unparalleled. Religious rhetoric floods the internet on countless websites, carrying
messages of hate, all in the name of Allah. This new, cyber dimension of warfare is well-suited for a force that maintains a relatively small footprint yet a
larger-than-life message. On the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, al
Qaeda and the Taliban, as did the Viet Cong, give residents only two choices
in supporting their efforts to draw fellow Muslims back to the “true Islam”:
join via peaceful persuasion or suffer sheer violence.
US Strategy for the Long War
The National Security Strategy (NSS) is the centerpiece of American national security policy. This March 2006 document clearly acknowledges the significant role religion plays in the Middle East today. President
Bush states his position as follows: “A new totalitarian ideology now threatens, an ideology grounded not in secular philosophy but in the perversion of a
proud religion. Its content may be different from the ideologies of the last
century, but its means are similar: intolerance, murder, terror, enslavement,
and repression.”28 The “Way Ahead” section of the NSS succinctly describes
the war on terror as a war of ideas and not a battle of religions; it also points
out how extremists are misinterpreting Islam to spread a new brand of religious hatred. While the NSS goes on to speak out against religious intolerance and misinformation, in the end it offers only a broad solution to
defeating terrorism in the Middle East—democracy and political reform:
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“The strategy to counter the lies behind the terrorist ideology is to empower
the very people the terrorists most want to exploit: the faithful followers of
Islam. We will continue to support political reforms that empower peaceful
Muslims to practice and interpret their faith.”29
The 2006 NSS clearly reflects the wisdom of the religious lessons
learned from the ongoing Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom.
Political reform and governance—not unity of effort to prevent the fall of
Islam—is the call to action. But with regard to Islam, the 2006 NSS is a vast
improvement over the September 2002 version, in which the words religion
and ideology were used just once. This suggests several questions, the foremost of which is this: If our leaders had better understood the religious underpinnings of the 9/11 attacks, as described in the 2006 NSS, before the
invasion of Iraq, would we have proceeded differently? One point is certain:
In the March 2006 release of the updated NSS, decisionmakers in the White
House clearly demonstrated their ability to apply recent lessons learned in the
Middle East to current national policy. They also correctly identify several
key elements currently driving the insurgency in Iraq and the conflict in general throughout the region. Regrettably, the NSS still falls short in addressing
religion as a source and catalyst for change, however. The need for a comprehensive religious assessment remains an issue that needs to be addressed in
the current US strategy for the global war on terror.
Prior to the release of the 2006 NSS, the President took the 2004 NSS
one step further in November 2005 when he published the National Strategy
for Victory in Iraq (NSV). The NSV defines US strategy in the “long war”
against Iraq. It depicts a clear strategy that will help the Iraqi people build a new
Iraq with a constitutional government that respects civil rights and has security
forces sufficient to maintain domestic order and to keep Iraq from becoming a
safe haven for terrorists.30 In spite of strong language from the President of the
United States, the Secretary of State, and the Attorney General, the NSV tenders little discussion on the key religious issues that are paralyzing the country
of Iraq today. But it does provide a detailed strategy for the integration of political, economic, and security objectives in the short, medium, and long terms.
These all-encompassing objectives are supported by strategic pillars that are
also regrettably void of any line of action to confront Iraq’s pressing religious
issues. In short, the NSV provides strong operational guidance for diplomats
and military leaders executing the war on terror in Iraq, but it is an executionoriented document that neglects to openly speak to a strategy regarding the
broader crisis in Islam. The primary focus of the NSV is best recapped by its defined short-term goals: “an Iraq that is making steady progress in fighting terrorists and neutralizing the insurgency; meeting political milestones; building
democratic institutions; standing up robust security forces to gather intelliAutumn 2006
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gence, destroy terrorist networks, and maintain security; and tackling key economic reforms to lay the foundation for a sound economy.”31
The March 2005 National Defense Strategy (NDS) adds to the strategy toward Iraq. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld sums it up as follows: “The NDS outlines our approach to dealing with challenges we likely
will confront, not just those we are currently best prepared to meet.”32 The
NDS provides outlines for targeting major terrorist vulnerabilities, the first of
which is countering ideological support for terrorism. Additionally, the NDS
identifies support models to build stronger ties to the Muslim community, to
help change Muslim misperceptions of the United States and the west, and to
reinforce the message that the Global War on Terrorism is not a war against
Islam.33 Although the NDS comments on DOD’s strategy to defeat religious
extremists, it lacks any in-depth discussion outlining plans to address the
ideological motivations of global terrorism. The National Security Strategy
and National Defense Strategy serve as the foundations and overarching
guidance that drive the creation of the National Military Strategy.
Then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers,
summarized the 2004 National Military Strategy (NMS) as follows: “The
NMS serves to focus the armed forces on maintaining US leadership in a
global community that is challenged on many fronts—from countering the
threat of global terrorism to fostering emerging democracies.34 The NMS provides modest guidance concerning extremist ideologies and focuses even less
on the issue of religion.
Finally, US forces deployed and preparing to deploy routinely demonstrate an ever-increasing level of sophistication in addressing the adaptive
nature of religious extremism. US policy needs to equally reflect a flexible posture, and an earnest will, to understand the strategic, operational, and tactical
natures of the insurgency, in order to establish relevant and reality-based lines
of action in the Middle East. This assessment of US strategic policy suggests
that our experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq highlight the need for a more comprehensive strategy to achieve longer-term national goals and objectives.35
At the strategic level of war, the integration of religion remains such
a nonstandard task that most military planners have difficulty knowing where
to begin. But lessons learned from the ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and
Iraq provide a solid start point. Our battle-hardened forces possess a wealth of
knowledge and on-the-ground experience that currently shapes the training
of units preparing to deploy. The Army recently instituted an enhanced cultural awareness program based on four years of combat operations in the Middle East. This program is designed to address issues concerning traditions,
customs, and religion. Cultural awareness training now includes lectures by
outside experts, Arabic language lessons, and recommended readings. More
60
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officers and enlisted soldiers have instituted study programs in basic Islam
and local mores to prepare for nation-building duties. Redeploying commanders openly share techniques and procedures that incorporate cultural
awareness into current tactics. Operational resources and funding levels have
also been adjusted to provide for more linguists and active recruitment of
Muslim clergy to active duty.

Bridging the Religious Divide:
A Strategy for Change
Bridging the religious divide between America and Islam requires
an enhanced understanding of the fundamentals of Islamic culture and extends to the development of effective counterstrategies that address the seminal issue of religious extremism. Such a strategy should include a religious
assessment of Islam and the Middle Eastern region.36
A religious assessment provides civil and military planners with a
tool for evaluating religious actors and their environments in a conflict or
post-conflict setting within a given theater of operations. The goal of the religious assessment is to enhance the speed of the learning process of civil and
military practitioners in conflict-prone settings. The following assessment
framework is organized around five distinct areas:
l Religious Ideology. Ideology plays a major role in shaping behavior in the Middle East.
l Culture. Islamic history, culture, traditions, and pride are rooted
in the Middle East.
l Religious Influence. Understanding who controls the power assists decisionmakers in determining where to focus resources and
efforts.
l Social Structure. Understanding the social structure of a society
allows for leaders and planners to develop support for the force
within the population.
l Strategic Communications. The internet and television play prominent roles in shaping perceptions, influencing mindsets, and inciting reactions.
The assessment framework also integrates the three levels of war; strategic,
operational, and tactical, which serve as the structure for the following recommendations.
Strategic Religious Assessment Considerations
The continued development of a counter-ideology in the form of traditional Sufi and modern Islamic teachings is essential. America needs to demonstrate the ability to translate such works into key languages and spread them
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using popular Muslim traditions and values. This is a global task that requires
coordinated support and backing from international governments, nongovernmental organizations, and peace-seeking Muslims worldwide. Muslims maintain many cultural bonds to the religious traditions of Islam. This reality gives
the Islamic faith the ability to cross national and cultural borders in the name of
religion. We must therefore identify regional holders of power and their religious affiliations. Leaders should follow this initiative with the identification
of the social caste and class structures, ethnic and tribal groups, sects, and other
kinships within the regions. This information will serve as the basis for defining the social and religious networks in play.
America also must seek alternative approaches to the strategic communications challenge of religious inaccuracy. We need to make better use of
media tools like CNN and regional television. Rafiq al Sabban points out that
in most Egyptian households, the Muslim holy month of Ramadan revolves
around television in the Arab world. Families watch shows like Al Hoor al
Ain (The Beautiful Virgins), which is loosely based on the November 2003
bombing in Saudi Arabia that killed 18 people, all of them Arab. The show is
one of several which challenge the view that Islam justifies terrorism.37
Scholars believe this type of Arab solution to the Islamic problem of extremism will resonate with young and old Muslims alike. Garnering Muslim support for anti-extremist Arab-based strategic communications should be a
priority in the global war on terror.
The television station Al Hurra (the Free One) is a noteworthy attempt by America to counter the extremist media assault. Reminiscent of
Voice of America, it is a 24-hour-a-day Arab television station created for a
Middle Eastern audience. Al Hurra’s primary message is freedom and democracy, and it focuses on positive news stories of American Arabs. The United
States should continue to develop this effort and find ways to counter Arab
criticisms that label Al Hurra as impartial and untrustworthy due to its American influence.
Finally, we should stop mislabeling terror. Islamic law scholar Khaled Abou El Fadl explains that radical extremists entirely ignore the Quranic teaching that the act of destroying or spreading ruin on this earth is one of
the gravest sins possible: “This is considered an ultimate act of blasphemy
against God. Those who corrupt the earth by destroying lives, property, and
nature are designated as mufsiduun (corruptors and evildoers) who, in effect,
wage war against God by dismantling the very fabric of existence. . . . [T]he
crime is called Hirabah (waging war against society).”38 Americans need to
avoid language that supports the insurgents’ position of jihad and mujahadin,
terms they often use to legitimize their use of indiscriminate violence in the
name of Allah.
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Operational Religious Assessment Considerations
Another recommended counterstrategy for combating extreme ideologies is the development of a national campaign that simply tells the truth
about Islamic doctrine. This effort should start with Muslims themselves collectively speaking out against the misinterpretations of the Quran to discredit
extremist ideology. Western (non-Muslim) attempts to expose extremist misgivings will never be accepted as credible to Islamists, or, for that matter, to
other Muslims. For many in the American military, a politician who has never
served a day in uniform and who criticizes the performance of the armed
forces lacks credibility; similarly, non-Muslims have no broad, accepted
credibility to speak authoritatively about the inaccuracies of Quranic teachings by Islamists.
We should also push to create environments within nation-states
where Muslim youth can create their own religious identity. We need to fight
against isolating and ostracizing Muslims who live outside the Middle East.
Negative attitudes within non-Muslim communities only serve to push new
recruits to Osama bin Laden and his religious extremist movement. In order
to achieve this objective, the international community has to foster a better
understanding of Arab culture, to include the traditions and practices of Islam. In America this begins by generating non-threatening surroundings for
Muslim Americans to openly live their faith.
Local leaders play a crucial role in shaping national environments.
America should take the lead in fostering relationships with Islamic leaders
across the globe. The first step is to identify the regional and national political
figures and their religious affiliations. Next, determine the type of power and
authority in use by religious leaders—social, political, or coercive. Then examine the social structures within the operational environment, which may
include mosques, hospitals, schools, and elite social networks.
Finally, the internet is a powerful tool in modern-day unconventional
warfare. America needs to redouble its efforts to neutralize the operations of
extremists in the cyberspace domain. The internet currently serves as the operational backbone of the insurgency’s command, control, and signal infrastructure. We need to develop the technology to control the flow of extremist
rhetoric on the internet, while taking advantage of this abundant source of
real-time intelligence. Our leaders should be prepared to disseminate progressive views, monitor opposing views, and collaborate with like-minded individuals and organizations offering support throughout the world.
Tactical Religious Assessment Considerations
Before commencing tactical operations, commanders should have access to any existing strategic (national) and operational (theater) religious asAutumn 2006
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sessments. These assessments should be modified to support tactical (local)
operations. A religious analysis also should provide the historical context of
the ongoing operations. The tactical environment provides leaders with the
best opportunity to collect information about the Islamic extremists’ internal
agenda by tracking and analyzing the quantitative data of his activities.
Tactical leaders should focus on these tasks:
l Determine the local ethnic and tribal fissures in the region.
l Track any attacks on religious actors, sites, or ethno-religious
groups.
l Identify the power elite for each religious party, including ethnic
and religious affiliations.
l Identify the language requirements for interaction with each religious group.
l Learn the local religious terms of reference and titles.
l Incorporate the symbols and rituals used by each tribe, sect, and
racial group.
l Account for the cultures and traditions that specifically address
local greetings, gestures, courtesies, and negotiations.

Conclusion
Army Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl got it right in his acclaimed
2005 book: in order to win the war against terror, America must first “learn to
eat soup with a knife.”39 Nagl’s point borrows from the T. E. Lawrence aphorism that war is messy, and in Iraq we must learn as we go. America, and all
nations, need to do more to embrace and understand Islam and the call for
truth. We must endeavor to understand the effects of integrating democracy
and freedom into the Islamic religion-based culture of Muslims. The last four
years clearly demonstrate that the compatibility of democracy and Islam has
not been a natural transition for Afghanistan or Iraq. The expected long war
against terrorism must account for more than defeating improvised explosive
devices and pacifying unruly clerics. The need for a better understanding of
Islam is only part of the solution.
If we are to succeed in Iraq and in the broader war on terror, we must
not fail to account for the forces driving social change and the manifold pressures surrounding political governance. Any counterinsurgent strategy to defeat the Islamist extremists should begin with a religious assessment, as
outlined above. Furthermore, US national security policy should be expanded to reflect language that unmistakably articulates our plan to fight the
war on terror—not a war on Islam. America’s grand strategy should reflect a
comprehensive understanding of why radical extremists fight and how we
can best influence extremist ideologies. One key objective should be to estab64
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lish a common understanding of what Islam, the Quran, and Sharia law truly
mean to Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Without that explanation, people
will tend to accept the unrefuted extremists’ views—further radicalizing
Muslims and turning the rest of the world against Islam itself.
America and its allies need to continue to vigilantly identify the advocates of extremism, understand their goals and strategies, evaluate their
strengths and weaknesses, and effectively counter their every move.40 Until
America takes additional steps to bridge the religious divide in the Middle
East, religion and radical extremism will continue to make for a messy, complex campaign.
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